The philosopher Dennett (1978) wanted to know if animals other than humans were second-order intentional systems. An intentional system in the philosophical sense is one that has mental stales (such as desires and beliefs) about things other than themselves. Dennett has little doubt that many nonhumans are first-order intentional systems in this sense. A second-order intentional system is one that can have beliefs, desires, and other intentions about other beliefs, desires, and intentions. To intentionally deceive someone, for example, the deceiver must be a second-order intentional system. The deceiver must have beliefs about the intended victim’s beliefs. Dennett requested friends to supply him with examples of nonhuman second-order intentional systems. Peter Ashley provided this compelling instance:
One evening 1 was lifting in a chair at my home, the only chair my dog is allowed to sleep in. The dog was lying in front of me, whimpering. She was getting nowhere in her tyring to “convince” me to give up the chair to her. Her next move is the most interesting, nay, the only interesting part of the story. She stood up, and went to the front door where I could still easily see her. She scratched the door, giving me the impression that she had given up trying to get the chair and had decided to go out. However, as soon as I reached the door to let her out, she ran back across the room and climbed into her chair, the chair she had “forced” me to leave (Dennett 1978. pp 274-75).
A simpler account might be as follows. The dog has a hierarchy of desires. Her currently strongest desire is to get into her chair, but this is blocked because her master is sitting in it. Consequently, her next highest desire is activated: she tries to get outside. When Ashley vacates the chair to let her out, however, she suddenly becomes aware that her first desire can now be fulfilled.
Προσωπικά, δεν μπορώ να καταλάβω γιατί η ψυχολογία της "απάτης" πέφτει στην ίδια λούμπα που πέφτουν όλοι εκείνοι οι επιστήμονες που προσπαθούν να αποδείξουν την ανωτερότητα του ανθρώπινου είδους! Ο σκύλος είτε είχε την πρόθεση να παρασύρει τον Αshley να φύγει από την καρέκλα είτε όχι, κατάφερε να κάνει εκείνο που ήθελε κι αυτό μετράει. Η συμπεριφορά του ζώου δεν πρέπει να εξετάζεται συγκρινόμενη με το πόσο σοφιστικέ είναι σε σχέση με εκείνη του ανθρώπου αλλά με το αν βοηθάει το ίδιο το ζώο να πετύχει το σκοπό του. Και άνθρωποι να είστε βέβαιοι ότι τα ζώα δεν σας χρειάζονται για να πετύχουν το σκοπό τους! Η ίδια φύση που προίκισε τον άνθρωπο με τη φυσική επιλογή, προίκισε και όλα τα είδη πανίδας και χλωρίδας αυτού του πλανήτη. Γιατί η φύση δεν κάνει διακρίσεις...
